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Abstract—This paper develops a stylized analytical model
that analyses reliability management of multiple TSOs. First
we analyse the possibilities for TSO cooperation on reserves
dispatch and procurement, with a focus on European network
codes. Then we propose a model that theoretically analyses cross-
border reserve cooperation. We distinguish two degrees of coop-
eration: reserves exchange and reserves sharing. Our model first
determines the non-cooperative TSO equilibrium i.e. the autarkic
provision of reserves. Next we compare this with the socially
optimal (cooperative) policy of generation reserves procurement.
The paper shows why reserves sharing is economically superior
to reserves exchange. Sharing allows cost arbitrage and pooling
of reserve needs while reserves exchange only takes care of cost
arbitrage. The benefits of reserves exchange and reserves sharing
depends on cost asymmetry and correlation of reserve needs
between the TSO zones.
Index Terms—Cross-border balancing, generation reserves,
multi-TSO interactions, power system reliability
I. INTRODUCTION
The main short-term responsibility of the Transmission
System Operator (TSO) in a deregulated electricity market
is to manage the security of the transmission system. Since
demand has to equal supply at all times but a perfect forecast
of demand and supply is not possible, in order to maintain
the reliability of the grid, the TSO has to deal with imbal-
ances in real time using upward and downward reserves. The
imbalances can be exacerbated due to increased penetration
of intermittent solar and wind generation [1]. In addition,
the available reserves should also be able to deal with large
and sudden imbalances caused by failures of transmission or
generation components. As today transmission networks are
interconnected between different countries, and the imbalances
due to intermittent power increase, the number of unscheduled
flows rises [2]. This trend increases both the need for reserves
and the costs for procurement and dispatch of these reserves.
This paper shows that cooperation between adjacent TSOs on
reserves dispatch and procurement reduces this cost.
The research leading to these results is partly funded by the European Union
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No
608540, project acronym GARPUR.
The benefits of TSO cooperation in reserves and balancing
have already been studied in the literature. A case-study
example describing the balancing done between Belgium and
Netherlands is presented in [3], who conclude that introduction
of a balancing market between those two countries is a ”lucra-
tive and achievable goal”. A more general conclusion - that
coordination of European balancing markets done by TSOs
should be one of the next steps towards the harmonisation
of electricity markets into the EU Internal Electricity Market
(IEM), is reached by [4]. Also [5] discuss similar issues
and quantify the benefits of inter-market benefits using a
stylised 4-node network. Likewise, [6] quantify the benefits of
cooperation and study the effects of transmission constraints.
Our paper employs a probabilistic approach and explicitly
incorporates costs and benefits of cross-border reserve procure-
ment. Such an approach is increasingly used to assess the gains
and the complexities of probabilistic criteria for transmission
reliability management [7] - [11].
Although the topic of integrated balancing markets is
present in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, there
is still a lack of understanding, whether and to what extent
TSO reliability management actions and interactions of gen-
eration reserves scheduling, as imposed by reliability criteria
in network codes, are economically efficient for the region as a
whole. Furthermore, these reliability criteria impose the levels
of required reserves and thus determine a certain reliability
level, without any reference to balancing the costs of reserves
and interruptions.
The contribution of this paper is a general model that
analyses three degrees of TSO cooperation in reserves pro-
vision. First, we examine autarkic TSO reserve provision -
a non-cooperative TSO equilibrium. Then we study reserves
exchange when a TSO can acquire reserve capacity in the
adjacent TSO area. The last case investigates reserves sharing.
Reserves sharing amounts to maximising the surplus of the
two nodes jointly and it allows both a cost arbitrage and
pooling of reserve needs. We show why reserves sharing is
economically superior to reserves exchange. We also present
a numerical example in order to provide an illustration of the
three scenarios.978-1-4673-8463-6/16/$31.00 c© 2016
This paper consists of seven sections. In Sections II and III
we review some of the ideas relevant to this paper, based on
the European network codes, and we explain the characteristics
of the different reserve categories. Section IV explains how
different TSOs can cooperate in reserve provision. Section V
introduces the main model that analyzes three degrees of TSO
cooperation. In order to illustrate the ideas of this paper, we
set up a numerical illustration in Section VI. The last section
concludes.
II. NETWORK CODES
Efficient power system reserves management consists of
three tasks:
1) Procure the correct level of reserves: dimensioning.
2) Efficient procurement of reserve: procure the cheapest
reserve capacity first.
3) Efficient dispatch of reserves: dispatch the cheapest
reserve capacity first.
In this paper we only consider the first two tasks.
Most transmission systems consist of different intercon-
nected networks, which are each governed by one TSO.
Since system frequency is shared on all voltage levels of
a synchronous area, due to the technical characteristics of
electricity, power system reliability is considered to be a
common good. That is, a non-excludable but rival good. This
means that a MW of power can only be used once and that
it is technologically difficult to prevent interconnected TSOs
from using more than they provide. Underprovision of reserves
in one TSO zone could thus lead to a widespread blackout
throughout the synchronous area. Therefore, to prevent this
‘Tragedy of the Commons’, all TSOs in a synchronous area
are obliged to provide sufficient reserves.
Within the European transmission system, rules on reserve
procurement and dispatch are formulated in two network
codes:1 the network code on Load-Frequency Control and
Reserves (NC LFCR) [12] and the network code on Electricity
Balancing (NC EB) [13]. These network codes also deal
with TSO cooperation in balancing and reserves. TSOs can
cooperate in three ways: (1) exchange of reserves, (2) reserves
sharing, and (3) imbalance netting. Section IV-B will explain
this in more detail. Currently, cooperation between TSOs is
widespread in forward markets, the day-ahead market (e.g.
flow-based market coupling) and the intraday market (e.g.
Elbas in Nord Pool). However, cooperation in balancing and
reserves is still limited [14]. Section IV-C lists some examples
of current reserve cooperation between Central European
TSOs.
III. RESERVE CATEGORIES
A myriad of different reserve product specifications and
balancing processes exists, differing in the response time,
ramp rate, availability, procurement procedure, bid selection,
bid activation, minimum bid size, bid resolution, settlement
procedure, nomination time, etc. However, European TSOs are
1Soon to be adopted as European Regulation
required by ENTSO-E’s network code on Electricity Balancing
(NC EB) to harmonize these products and procedures to a
certain extent in coming years. The network code on Load-
Frequency Control and Reserves (NC LFCR) divides reserve
products into three main categories: (1) Frequency Contain-
ment Reserves (FCR), which stabilizes the frequency after a
disturbance, (2) Automatic and Manual Frequency Restoration
Reserves (aFRR and mFRR), which brings the frequency back
to its setpoint value, and (3) Reserve Replacement (RR), which
replaces the active reserves such that they are available to react
to new disturbances. FCR are dimensioned and distributed
within a synchronous area, i.e. over multiple TSOs, while
activation of FRR and RR is the responsibility of the TSO
whose area is disturbed. Fig. 1 summarizes the role and
sequence of activation of the different reserve products.
Fig. 1. Role and sequence of activation of the different reserve products:
FCR, aFRR, mFRR and RR [15]
IV. TSO COOPERATION
A. Reserve dimensioning
A first step in reliability management is determining the
correct level of each of the different kind of reserves. In
Europe, the dimensioning of FRR and RR is done at the
level of the Load Frequency Control (LFC) block. Most
LFC blocks consist of one TSO2 who is responsible for
managing the area. The dimensioning rule requires procured
reserves to be sufficient to deal with the largest imbalance,
the so-called dimensioning incident (DI), from tripping of
one demand facility, one HVDC interconnector, one power
generating module or one AC line within the LFC block.
Dimensioning of FCR capacity is done at the level of
the synchronous area. That is, total procured FCR capacity
in the synchronous area should be able to deal with the
largest imbalance from tripping of two connection points,
two power generation modules or two HVDC interconnectors.
The FCR capacity that is determined from this rule is evenly
distributed within the synchronous area. When a component
2Examples of exceptions: LFC block Germany exists of four LFC areas,
each governed by one TSO; Spain and Portugal constitute an LFC block.
of the synchronous area fails, FCR capacity will react in all
TSO zones of the synchronous area, as shown in Fig. 1.
B. Exchanging and sharing reserves
TSO cooperation can increase efficiency in reserves man-
agement in at least two ways:
(A) Cost arbitrage: if the reserve market is enlarged, expen-
sive reserves can be substituted for cheaper procurement
and dispatch of reserves.
(B) Pooling of reserve needs: less reserve capacity is
needed if idle reserve capacity can be used in neigh-
boring TSO zones in need of capacity.
According to the network codes, TSOs can cooperate in
three ways:
• Exchange of reserves makes it possible to procure part
of the required level of reserves in adjacent LFC blocks.
These reserves are exclusively for one TSO, meaning that
they cannot contribute to meeting another TSO’s required
level of reserves. This is an exchange of contractual
obligations between TSOs. That is, the reserve capacity
remains in the reserve-providing TSO zone, however, if
needs arise the exchange results in physical delivery of
power to the reserves-receiving TSO.
• Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to take into
account the same reserves to meet their reserve require-
ments resulting from reserve dimensioning.
• Imbalance netting avoids counteracting activation of
balancing energy in adjacent TSO zones.
Exchange of reserves only allows cost arbitrage (A), while
reserves sharing allows both cost arbitrage and variance-
reducing pooling of reserve needs (A)+(B). However, in prac-
tice reserves exchange and sharing is not limitless. Table I
summarizes the limits of the NC LFC&R on the quantity of
reserves sharing and exchange between LFC blocks within a
synchronous area.
TABLE I
LIMITS ON EXCHANGE AND SHARING OF RESERVES BETWEEN LFC
BLOCKS AS FORMULATED IN THE NETWORK CODE ON LOAD-FREQUENCY
CONTROL AND RESERVES [12]
Exchange Sharing
FCR
30% min in own LFC block
30% max per adjacent LFC block
& <100MW per adj. LFC block
Not allowed
FRR 50 % min in own LFC block Decrease of FRR < 50%& < |DI − FRR(99%)|
RR 50 % min in own LFC block Decrease of RR < 50%
That is, minimally 30% of dimensioned FCR capacity, and
50% of FRR and RR capacity, needs to remain physically
in the own LFC area. The term |DI − FRR(99%)| means
that the decrease of FRR capacity cannot be larger than the
difference between the initial dimensioning incident and the
reserves needed to meet the reserve need in 99% of the time.
The FCR volume is determined for the whole synchronous
area and each TSO must ensure its initial FCR obligation.
Sharing of FCR is not allowed as this would reduce the overall
available FCR for the synchronous area. Thus the only option
for cross-zonal cooperation in FCR is exchanging FCR bal-
ancing capacity. Doing so, TSOs do not physically exchange
FCR between countries but take over initial obligations from
other TSOs.
C. Examples
Balancing and reserve cooperation between European TSOs
is still in its infancy. However, a few examples of successful
cooperation exist:
• aFRR is jointly procured by all German TSOs.
• Elia procures part of its FCR obligations in France.
• Tennet (NL+GE) and Elia share part of their mFRR
(300MW).
• Common procurement of FCR in Germany, Switzerland,
Austria and the Netherlands.
• Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Czech
Republic, Switzerland and Austria have implemented a
system of imbalance netting.
V. MODEL
Our model studies reserves sharing and exchange between
two TSO zones i = 1, 2. The need for reserves in TSO zone
i at a certain instant is ri [MW]. This is the imbalance in
real time due to a combination of forecast errors of demand
and intermittent supply, and failures of generation capacity
or transmission components. We denote the joint probability
density function of the reserve needs ri by f(r1, r2); r1 and r2
are assumed to be non-negatively correlated and jointly normal
with known parameters. The TSO’s variable of choice is Ri
[MW], the quantity of reserves procured.3
In this paper we are interested in efficiency gains from
exchange or sharing of reserve procurement, not efficient
dispatch as such. Hence, the model does not take generation
dispatch into consideration and we therefore take marginal
generation costs to be equal to zero. Costs of procuring Ri
MW of reserve capacity in TSO zone i, however, are not
zero and are given by γi(Ri), with γi increasing, smooth and
convex.
We only model reserve needs in the first quadrant of the two-
dimensional space of reserve needs (r1, r2). Reserve needs in
the second and fourth quadrant, i.e. when the reserve needs
have a different sign (imbalance netting), are irrelevant when
generation costs are zero. The analysis for reserve needs in the
third quadrant, i.e. for negative reserve procurement, is similar
to the analysis of positive reserve procurement.
A. Order of Events
The order of events is as follows:
Ex-ante (before uncertainty is realised):
1. The TSO at node i chooses how much reserve capacity
Ri to procure.
Ex-post (after uncertainty is realised):
3Even though section III explained the different reserve categories in some
detail, for simplification we neglect in this model differentiation between
different kinds of reserves (FCR, aFRR, mFRR and RR).
2. In real time the actual need for reserves ri is observed
in each node i.
3. The procured reserves will be used to accommodate the
reserve needs. In case local reserves are insufficient,
TSOs will use exchanged or shared reserves, or carry
out load shedding.
4. Settlement payments are paid.
Note that the choice of reserve capacity could be for
different time horizons, e.g. for an hour, a week, a month,
or a year. The probability density function f(r1, r2) will in
general depend on the procurement interval and the time to
real time operation. In case of exchange or sharing of reserves,
the procurement entails payments between TSOs.
B. Autarkic TSO reserve provision
We first consider the case where there is no trade or
exchange of reserves between zones. Thus, each TSO zone
operates as an isolated ”island”. The dimensioning rules, as
explained in section IV-A, define how much reserves each LFC
area is required to procure. The dimensioning incident was one
component failure for FRR and RR, and a joint failure of two
components for FCR. Here we pursue an alternative approach
by assuming that TSO i procures a quantity of reserves Ri
such that expected social surplus in zone i is maximized. That
is, he selects Ri to maximize E[Si] with respect to Ri, where
E[Si] = v(Di −
∫
∞
Ri
(ri −Ri)f(ri) dri)− γi(Ri), (1)
and v is the value of lost load (VOLL) [e/MWh]. Gross
surplus from electricity consumption is the product of VOLL
and electricity demand Di. Interruption cost is the product of
VOLL and the quantity of unserved expected demand (given
by the integral in (1)). Net consumer surplus is the difference
of these two terms. Social surplus in zone i, Si, is given by
consumer surplus less the cost of procuring reserves.
The optimal reserve capacity in autarky, R∗i,a, is determined
from the following first-order condition:
vPr{ri > Ri} = γ′i(Ri), (2)
which is obtained by differentiating (1). The intuition of this
condition is that reserves are procured up to the point where
the marginal cost of interruptions - given by VOLL times the
loss of load probability - equals the marginal cost of providing
that level of reserves.
It is easily seen that the second-order condition for maxi-
mum of E[Si] is satisfied.
C. Reserves Exchange
As explained earlier, reserves exchange makes it possible
to procure part of the required level of reserves in adjacent
TSO zones. We assume that sufficient transmission capacity
is available to always accommodate the flows arising from
use of reserve capacity in adjacent TSO zones. That is, there
is only load-shedding if ri > Ri, irrespective of where the
reserve capacity is procured. Exchange of reserves only allows
cost arbitrage, not pooling of reserve needs. Here we assume,
compliant with the network codes, that the required level of
reserves in each TSO zone is the same as in autarky, i.e. R∗i,a.
We also assume that the two TSOs jointly minimise total
costs of procurement, subject to the constraint on reserves.
That is, cheapest reserve capacity in the two TSO zones is
procured first. This amounts to the following constrained cost
minimization:4
min
R1,R2
γ1(R1) + γ2(R2) s.t. R1 +R2 = R∗1,a +R
∗
2,a. (3)
This leads to the following set of equations:{
γ′1(R1) = γ
′
2(R2)
R1 +R2 = R
∗
1,a +R
∗
2,a.
(4)
That is, costs are lowest when the marginal cost of reserve
procurement is equal in all TSO zones. Fig. 2 shows this cost
minimization graphically. The axis runs from left to right for
TSO zone 1 and from right to left for TSO zone 2. Clearly,
if costs are symmetrical in the two zones, then there is no
reason to exchange reserves and the optimal solution is for
each TSO to procure reserves within his own zone. If costs
are asymmetrical, then there is a rationale for exchange. The
grey area in the figure is this reduction of procurement costs
under a pay-as-bid system. The costs of the reserves-providing
TSO (Zone 1 in the figure) will clearly rise so, to make this
arrangement incentive compatible, the reserves-receiving TSO
needs to pay the reserves-providing TSO an amount that at
least covers the latter TSO’s costs.5
γ′2(R2)
γ′1(R1)
R∗1,a R
∗
2,a
e/MWh
R1R2
Fig. 2. Cost minimization under reserves exchange between two TSO zones
Reserves exchange allows the reserves-receiving TSO to
procure reserves more cheaply than under autarky. However,
the cost-minimization does not incorporate the VOLL and
does not allow to change the quantity of reserves, i.e. it does
not maximize expected surplus. Likewise, reserves exchange
4As a simplification, we neglect any limits on reserves exchange, as
explained earlier in table I.
5The behaviour of the two TSOs and the contract needed for cooperation
is not studied in detail in this paper. TSOs could have an incentive to act
strategically while cooperating with adjacent TSOs. For example by distorting
the congestion signal in cross-border congestion management [16] or by
spending too little on network maintenance [17].
does not exploit the possibility of pooling reserve needs with
adjacent TSOs.
D. Reserves Sharing
Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to draw on the same
reserves resources to meet their required level of reserves
when it comes to operation. It allows both cost arbitrage and
pooling of reserve needs, including sharing of interruptions if
necessary. As before, we assume that transmission capacity is
sufficient to always accommodate the flows arising from use of
reserve capacity in adjacent TSO zones. That is, there is only
load-shedding if r1 + r2 > R1 + R2. In our model, reserves
sharing amounts to maximizing the surplus of the two nodes
jointly, i.e. maximizing E[S1 + S2].6 Expected social surplus
in the two zones together may be written as
E[S1 + S2] = v(D1 +D2−∫
∞
0
∫
∞
R1+R2
(r1 + r2 − (R1 +R2))f(r1, r2) dr1 dr2)
− γ1(R1)− γ2(R2). (5)
The optimal reserve capacities when reserves sharing is al-
lowed, R∗
1,S and R∗2,S , are determined from the following
first-order conditions:{
vPr{r1 + r2 > R1 +R2} = γ′1(R1)
vPr{r1 + r2 > R1 +R2} = γ′2(R2),
(6)
which are derived by differentiation of (5) with respect to R1
and R2, respectively. The intuition for this set of first order
conditions is to procure reserves in each TSO zone up to the
point where the total marginal cost of interruptions, i.e. the
product of VOLL and the loss of load probability (LOLP) in
the two zones jointly, equals the marginal cost of providing
that level of reserves.
The first-order equations imply that marginal costs of re-
serves procurement are equal to VOLL times the loss of load
probability in the two zones together. Clearly, this implies that
marginal costs of procurement are equal at the optimal levels
of procurement. Hence, the costs of reserves procurement are
minimized as in reserves exchange, but for different levels of
reserves and, hence, also reliability.
E. Comparing the three cases
The comparison of the three scenarios yields that the
overall expected social surplus with reserves sharing is higher
than with reserves exchange. This follows from noting that
reserves exchange is a constrained version of reserves sharing.
Moreover, the overall expected social surplus with reserves
exchange is higher than that in autarky, which is the case
unless the zones are fully symmetric, since costs of reserves
procurement are lower and interruption costs are the same.
Another important thing to note is that when the zones
are asymmetric, there will be distributional consequences of
reserves exchange. Reserves costs will fall in one zone and
6As a simplification, we neglect any limits on reserves sharing, as explained
earlier in table I.
rise in the other. There is a minimal payment that will suffice
to make exchange incentive compatible. There will still be a
surplus that may be split in some way between the two zones,
e.g. by Nash bargaining. However, we do not consider this
issue here.
With reserves sharing, there may also be distributional con-
sequences that make one zone better off and the other worse
off, both as regards reserves costs and expected interruptions.
Similarly to reserves exchange, for incentive compatibility of
sharing there will be a minimal side payment from the better
off zone to the one that is worse off.
VI. ILLUSTRATION
In this section we present a numerical example to illustrate
the comparison of the three regimes (autarky, reserves ex-
change and reserves sharing). The base case for the illustration
is that the probability density functions of reserve needs are
jointly normal with correlation ρ, each with a mean of 10
MW and a variance of 5 MW: N(10,5). The cost of reserve
procurement is γi(Ri) = ciR2i . Table II shows the results of
this numerical illustration.
The first three columns show procured reserves in each
of the TSO zones and the sum of all procured reserves, for
each degree of cooperation. The fourth column expresses total
procured reserves relative to the procured reserves in autarky.
The fifth column shows the total cost, which is the sum of
expected interruption costs and procurement costs in both TSO
zones. The last column expresses the total cost relative to the
autarky cost.
The first part of the table shows the results of a symmetric
case, i.e. marginal procurement costs are equal in the two TSO
zones. The correlation coefficient is zero. In the second part
of the table, procurement cost is twice as high in TSO zone
1, while the correlation coefficient increases from zero to one.
TABLE II
RESERVES AND COSTS IN TSO ZONE 1 AND 2: RR = RELATIVE
RESERVES; TC = TOTAL COST; RC = RELATIVE COST.
c1 = c2 = 2 R1 R2 R1+R2 RR TC RC
Autarky 15.05 15.05 30.10 100% 998.4 100%
Exchange 15.05 15.05 30.10 100% 998.4 100%
Sharing ρ = 0 13.63 13.63 27.26 90.5% 801.7 80.3%
c1 = 4, c2 = 2
Autarky 14.46 15.05 29.50 100% 1431.9 100%
Exchange 9.83 19.67 29.50 100% 1303.7 91%
Sharing, ρ = 0 8.97 17.95 26.92 91.3% 1046.1 73.1%
Sharing ρ = 0.5 9.46 18.93 28.39 96.2% 1178.8 82.3%
Sharing ρ = 1 9.87 19.74 29.61 100.4% 1295.3 90.5%
This illustration shows several important issues. In the first
case, when the two TSO zones are identical, no cost arbitrage
is possible and exchange of reserve does not yield any cost
reduction. However, reserves sharing leads to a lower reserve
need and thus a lower cost. In the second case, when the
cost of reserve procurement is higher in TSO zone 1, reserves
exchange does yield a cost reduction. TSO 1 procures part
of its reserve obligation with reserve capacity providers in
TSO zone 2. The resulting cost reduction, between autarky
and exchange, of 128.2 e/h can be a gain for TSO 1, TSO 2
or distributed between both (e.g. through Nash bargaining). In
reserves sharing, costs are evidently even lower. Again, how
this cost reduction is distributed over the two TSOs depends
on the details of the inter-TSO contract. The table shows that
the cost reduction decreases when the reserve needs in the two
TSO zones are more correlated. When the reserve needs are
fully correlated, reserves sharing yields almost no additional
cost reduction compared to reserves exchange.
Lastly, the total procured reserves do not always decrease
with reserves sharing. When costs are asymmetric but reserve
needs are highly correlated, the decreased procurement cost
due to cooperation could entail more reserves to be procured
optimally, i.e. a higher reliability level. Fig. 3 summarizes the
cost reductions of this illustration.
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Fig. 3. Relative cost (compared to autarky) with reserves exchange and
reserves sharing, as a function of the cost asymmetry and the correlation
ρ between the reserve needs.
This figure shows that the cost reduction increases when
reserve procurement costs become more asymmetric and re-
serve needs are less correlated. With low cost asymmetry and
low correlation, reserves sharing yields the major part of the
cost reduction, while with high cost asymmetry and a high
correlation, reserves exchange yields the major part of the cost
reduction. With symmetric costs and high correlation, cross-
border cooperation in reserves yields very little cost reduction.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper compares three degrees of TSO cooperation in
generation reserves provision: autarky, reserves exchange and
reserves sharing. We derive analytically, in a relatively stylized
model, the optimal procurement of reserves in each of the three
cases and show that costs, which are expected to rise with
increasing penetration of renewable generation, decrease with
cooperation. The benefits of reserves exchange and reserves
sharing depends on cost asymmetry and correlation of reserve
needs between the TSO zones. That is, when TSO zones
have highly asymmetric reserve procurement costs but highly
correlated reserve needs, reserves exchange already yields
a high cost reduction. When TSO zones have fairly equal
reserve procurement costs but a low degree of reserve needs
correlation, reserves sharing is needed to reap the full benefits
of TSO reserves cooperation.
National electricity markets are increasingly interconnected
in Europe, spurred by European Regulations, Directives and
network codes. In the day-ahead market there has been con-
siderable progress in coupling national markets at the regional
level, however, cooperation in balancing and reserves has
been minimal and limited to a few voluntary agreements. The
Network Code on Electricity Balancing discusses how TSOs
ought to cooperate. This paper shows analytically the cost
reduction for different degrees of cooperation. A next step is
to include transmission constraints and analyse the effect on
the benefits of multi-TSO cooperation.
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